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Insurgent capitalism: Island,
bricolage and the re-making
of finance
Donald MacKenzie and Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra
Abstract
Drawing on recent discussions of the material cultures of markets and of financial
innovation as bricolage, this paper explores the development of Island, a new
share-trading venue set up in 1995. We examine Island’s roots in a very specific
conflict in the US financial markets and in the information libertarianism of
‘hacker culture’, and examine the material bricolage involved in Island’s
construction. The paper also outlines the processes that led to a dramatic
‘Latourian’ change of scale: Island was originally a ‘micro’ development on the
fringes of US markets, but within little more than a decade key features of Island
became close to compulsory, as the nature of North American and Western
European share trading changed utterly.
Keywords: social studies of finance; materiality; bricolage; Island; matching
engine; high-frequency trading.
If you walk down Broad St in lower Manhattan, you cannot help noticing the
neo-classical façade of the New York Stock Exchange, the police barriers and
the tourists taking photographs. A hundred metres further south, you would
probably pass 50 Broad St without a second glance. It has a handsome enough
frontage, but otherwise seems an ordinary Manhattan office building (Figure 1):
one of its occupants in the 1990s told us that ‘it was such poor office space no
real company would ever be in there … the space was weird and long and dark
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… catacombed with small little firms’ (Andresen interview). By 2012, there was
only one remaining vestige of the role the building, now renovated, had played
in the history of finance: inscribed in panels attached to the stonework above an
empty shop-front is the word ‘island’.1
At one level, the story of Island – a new electronic platform for the trading
of shares – is a microhistory, an account of the efforts of a small number of
people over a few years (1995–2002) in a handful of rooms in a nondescript
New York building. When we have just witnessed, and continue to witness,
what Bryan and colleagues, writing in the pages of this journal, rightly call
the giant-scale ‘tsunami destructiveness of financial instability’ (Bryan, Martin,
Figure 1 50 Broad St, October 2012. Authors’ photograph
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et al., 2012, p. 309), a focus on the small-scale may seem suspect, exactly the
kind of thing that has led to suspicion of research on finance influenced by
science and technology studies (see, for instance, Bryan et al., 2012; Riles,
2010). While the suspicion has multiple layers – one of which is discussed
briefly in note 4 below – a basic concern is nicely expressed by The Guardian’s
Aditya Chakrabortty. Attention to the small-scale – to what seems like ‘detail’ –
may appear to ignore ‘context or politics’, to paint a picture that is ‘all cogs and
no car’ (Chakrabortty, 2012). However, actor-network theory has taught us,
ever since the earliest statement of it in English (Callon & Latour, 1981), to
beware the assumption of fixed scale implicit in Chakrabortty’s metaphor: as
actor-network theorists argue, the small (the ‘micro’, the cogs) can become big
(the ‘macro’, the car), and vice versa. Such changes of scale are rare events, but
we are dealing here with one of them: Island has become a continent.
What we mean by that is that Island was the paradigm (in the more
profound of the two main Kuhnian senses)2 of the modern North American,
Western European and East Asian trading of shares: it became the single most
influential exemplar of how shares should be traded. Island charged unprece-
dently low fees. It was the first trading venue fully and deliberately to facilitate
entirely automatic trading. The practice of co-location (of placing trading
firms’ servers right next to a trading venue’s ‘matching engine’) was first
introduced by Island. ‘Rebates’ – an incentive crucial to the contemporary
economics of share trading, explained below – began with Island. In the late
1990s, these were features Island voluntarily chose. Within a decade, they
became close to necessary: they are features that by around 2008 it was hard
for a share-trading venue in North America, Western Europe and East Asia not
to have. They are increasingly to be seen too in ‘emerging markets’: Brazil, in
particular, has a very active automated-trading sector.
The history of Island speaks to an apparent dichotomy in scholarship on
markets. On the one hand, the propagation of Island’s model – its emphasis on
automatic trading and on the importance of speed, its low fees and novel form
of market incentive – invokes well-known discussions of how innovators
transform fields (Fligstein, 1996) and of the processes that generate institu-
tional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1986). On the other hand, Island
references the importance of materiality and its associated cultures (cf. Miller,
2005). Influenced by work in science and technology studies (Pinch &
Swedberg, 2008) and perhaps also by a strong tradition of ethnographies of
exchange (e.g. Geertz, 1978), a recent sociological tradition focuses on how
artefacts are implicated in constructing, maintaining and transforming markets.
This tradition takes account of the cogs, to borrow Chakrabortty’s metaphor.
Think, for instance, of canonical studies of market devices that co-ordinate
valuation and are generative of economic action (Beunza & Stark, 2004; Callon
& Muniesa, 2005; Preda, 2006). Island was one such device: through code,
cables and computers, it orchestrated an electronic market-place.
Studies of fields and of calculative devices are, however, relatively
disconnected. They appear to deal with phenomena of different sizes and
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scopes: the macrostructures of fields and institutions versus the microstruc-
tures of calculation and exchange. In this paper, we bridge this apparent divide
through history. Studying the trajectories taken by market devices, and the
institutions they enable, allows us to see a crucial aspect of how the markets
around us, to paraphrase David (1985), got to be the way they are. For
example, histories of market devices make visible forms of cultural work that
shape broader economic structures. Like bicycles, machine tools and genomic
techniques, market devices – from trading pits to trading screens, from
cheques to point-of-sale systems – are as much cultural projects as they are
feats of engineering. They are, however, often not ‘big culture’ projects, but –
at least initially – ‘little culture’ projects, rooted in local struggles and in
material ‘bricolage’ (see below) guided by local priorities.
Island is a case of that kind in two ways. First, its roots were in an
exceptionally sharp but very specific conflict within the trading of shares on
NASDAQ at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s. The side in the conflict
out of which Island evolved often saw itself as challenging finance’s established
order and contesting the privileges of insiders. Second, Island exemplified a
specific thread within computer programming in the United States: ‘hacker’
culture (Levy, 1984; Turner, 2006). This was and is libertarian (although by
no means always in the left-wing sense of libertarianism), committed to
opening up technologically or socially closed systems, and hostile to over-
restrictive forms of intellectual property. Our title highlights these two aspects
of Island: its conflict with the established order of trading and its culture of
‘information libertarianism’. Island was a capitalist enterprise – a very
successful one – but it was shaped also by these two forms of dissent.
Culture, bricolage and market technologies
What are markets made of? Sociology has challenged the ‘ontological
indeterminacy’ (Lie, 1997, p. 342) of markets that characterizes neo-classical
economic thought: its lack of attention to the specific material and cultural
forms that markets take. Markets are ‘social arenas where firms, their suppliers,
customers, workers, and government interact’ (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007,
p. 107). They are not an ahistorical abstraction, but rather are formed by
tangible social elements, be they institutional fields structured through
resource and power differentials between agents (Fligstein, 1990, 2001;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1986), relational networks that define the possibilities of
action and shape the dynamics of exchange (Granovetter, 1985) or collections
of actants that articulate valuation (Callon, 1998; Callon & Muniesa, 2005).
It is that last answer to the question ‘what are markets made of?’ that is
particularly relevant here. ‘Performativity’ scholars have answered: markets are
made of calculation, but calculation embedded not just in social networks;
rather, the focus in the approach inspired by Callon has been on calculation
created through the interactions between humans and their ‘prostheses, tools,
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equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc.’ (Callon, 2005, p. 4). It is a
distributed form of calculation (Hutchins, 1995), a cognitive system in which
pattern recognition and categorization is co-ordinated across and between both
multiple human beings and instruments of different sorts (e.g. Hardie &
MacKenzie, 2007).
Adding technology and techniques to the ontology of markets introduces
new questions to economic sociology. How is it, for instance, that market
technologies are created, selected and grow to become dominant? How did
Island become a continent? The ever-present temptation of simplistic, even
technologically determinist views of innovation means that (as Engelen et al.,
2011, point out) we need to be very careful how we conceptualize ‘financial
innovation’. An important hypothesis of the sociology of science and
technology – invoked in the case of finance theory in MacKenzie (2003) and
generalized to financial innovation at large by Engelen et al. (2011) – is that
successful innovation is nearly always bricolage: the creative, ad hoc re-use of
existing resources (ideas and other cultural resources as well as artefacts),3 not
the mechanical implementation of a grand plan nor simply logical deduction
from existing scientific theory (or, in the case of finance, from economics – a
reading of the idea of performativity that surely cannot be correct).4
Island is a good test of the bricolage hypothesis because it is tempting to see
it – harbinger as Island was of what has become a hegemonic form of market –
as simply a product of contemporaneous ‘big culture’ ideologies such as neo-
liberalism. Indeed – on the face of it – Island was the product of a man with a
plan. Its co-founder Josh Levine, had a ‘dream’, as the main existing source on
Island puts it, and in the new trading venue that dream was to ‘come alive’
(Patterson, 2012, p. 107). While not disputing Levine’s centrality, we will
argue, as suggested above, that his ‘dream’ was initially forged quite locally, in
a very specific material-cultural struggle. Indeed, the bricolage hypothesis
strikes us as likely to hold more generally. Neither economics nor ideology
defines singlehandedly the constitution of markets. Even in a case in which
there is an explicit ideological commitment to a particular idea of the market-
place – in the United States, the main market regulator, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), long advocated mechanization as imperative for
financial markets – the making of devices involves putting together, retuning
and refashioning systems. To be successful this bricolage has to be oriented
towards local situations and immediate problems as well as wider goals, and it
sometimes inverts the relationship between ends and means. The makers of
finance’s technologies help to shape the mise-en-scène, but they do so by
drawing on existing materials to solve concrete problems.
The bricolage hypothesis has a corollary: history matters. If innovation is
shaped by local experiences and local priorities and consists mainly of the
creative re-use of existing resources, then those experiences, priorities and
resources can have lasting effects. Again, this corollary – the essential
historicity of innovation – is widely accepted in technology studies, where
the canonical illustration is David’s (1985) example, the QWERTY keyboard: a
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configuration shaped by the specific exigencies of mechanical typewriters that
has remained entrenched even after such typewriters have nearly vanished. If
historicity is also present in finance, it means that the outcomes of local
struggles and local culture can be consequential. As Riles (2010, p. 795) argues,
‘finance is an explicit politics … a purposeful and stated compulsion of self and
others, a realm of must, shall, and will’. Devices permit and compel, just as
laws, regulations and ideologies do, and if their histories matter, then the
‘explicit politics’ of finance is shaped locally as well as globally.
Sources
Island has attracted little attention in the academic literature. We know of only
three papers that discuss it, all by economists (Biais et al., & Spatt, 2003;
Hasbrouck & Saar, 2001; Hendershott & Jones, 2005), and none of these
investigates what we are interested in: how Island was shaped and what its
consequences were for the evolution of financial markets. Our examination of
these issues draws on three sets of primary sources. First is the primary-source
documents that remain available on the website (josh.com) of Island’s co-
founder, Josh Levine: particularly useful are the source code of the most
crucial part of Island’s computer system, its ‘matching engine’ (Levine, n.d.); a
guide (Anonymous, n.d.) to Watcher, the system out of which Island
developed; and a compilation (Anonymous, 1995–1997) of the messages sent
to Watcher users between March 1995 and December 1997.5
The second set of sources is interviews. We interviewed Matt Andresen,
who was appointed Island’s CEO in 1998, and six of its employees.6 These
interviews form part of a larger corpus of interviews (numbering 140 in total),
which we have conducted with those involved in the mechanization of trading
venues and of trading itself (we draw on this wider corpus mainly when
discussing the processes that led Island’s features to become all-pervasive in
share trading in the United States). Levine met with MacKenzie, but preferred
to answer our questions by email rather than be interviewed face-to-face: we
sent him these questions in two large batches, to which he responded in
January and May 2012. Levine also made available to us a corpus of email
messages he wrote to provide information for a Wired article about Island
(Brekke, 1999).
Contemporaneous articles, such as Brekke’s, in the financial and other press
form our third set of sources. In addition, after the empirical sections of this
paper were drafted and circulated to Levine and our interviewees, a popular
book in which Island features heavily appeared (Patterson, 2012). Its overall
tone is somewhat sensationalist, and some passages involve authorial imagina-
tion rather than documented history. However, these passages aside, its factual
narrative is generally well-sourced, and we draw on it in a number of places
below.
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NASDAQ broker-dealers versus ‘SOES bandits’
The immediate context of the emergence of Island was not its Broad St
neighbour, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but geographically
dispersed ‘over-the-counter’ share trading (i.e. trading outwith exchanges
such as NYSE). To trade shares, over-the-counter broker-dealers, wherever
they were located in the United States, were forced by 1930s regulations to
join a regulated securities association. Of the several organizations that
emerged, one came to dominate: the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), established in 1938.
Trading in NASD took place over the telephone rather than on a trading
floor. Sitting at their desks, those who wanted to buy or sell shares would call
NASD broker-dealers (which were either stand-alone firms or divisions of big
stockbrokers and securities houses) to obtain quotes for particular stocks;
orders would be executed over the phone and clearing and settlement (the
exchange of share certificates and money) were arranged by the accounting
departments of the broker-dealer firm and the buyer or seller. Amidst the
cacophony of telephone conversations was a very physical flow of paper slips –
and in this flow, the SEC thought, surveillance was compromised. By
comparison to exchanges where trading was centralized in a physical venue,
the geographically dispersed over-the-counter market that NASD dominated
was opaque and difficult to oversee. In 1963, the SEC’s Special Study of
Securities Markets saw automation as the solution. New computer technologies
permitted, in particular, using ‘a central computer to record and report
interdealer quotations for some or all over-the-counter securities on a
continuous basis’, perhaps even ‘wholly new means of matching buy and sell
orders and even accomplishing their executions in some circumstances’ (SEC,
1963, p. 668). Out of the Special Study came a dramatic transformation: in
exchange for receiving broader enforcement powers, NASD adopted a version
(albeit a limited one) of the SEC’s recommendations on automation. NASD
automated quote dissemination via NASDAQ: the NASD Automated Quota-
tions system, introduced in 1971. Controlled by the broker-dealers of NASD,
NASDAQ grew to become one of the largest markets in America, playing a
fundamental role in configuring the emerging digital economy of the last
decades of the twentieth century. The new companies at the heart of that
economy typically chose to list their shares on NASDAQ, not the New York
Stock Exchange.
While NASDAQ’s electronic systems facilitated some forms of surveillance,
they did little to erode long-established practices of broker-dealers. NAS-
DAQ’s structure was, by design, one that should have introduced competition
in prices to the over-the-counter market. Unlike the NYSE, where a
‘specialist’ was the auctioneer for a specific security (with only one specialist
for each stock), NASDAQ’s market-makers were supposed to compete with
each other: there are multiple broker-dealers in the same stock. That they did
so only to a limited extent was, however, discovered by economists William
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Christie and Paul Schultz (1994), who found that in many stocks NASDAQ
broker-dealers avoided posting quotes – bids to buy shares, or offers to sell
them – in odd eighths of dollars (⅛, ⅜, ⅝ or ⅞). (In the early 1990s, the
tradition in the United States of quoting securities prices in eighths of dollars
was still in force.)
Avoiding odd eighths may sound like a minor aspect of the ‘cogs’ of
financial markets, a mere numerical curiosity, but it had a substantial economic
consequence. Retail investors wanting to buy or sell NASDAQ shares in effect
had to do so – directly or indirectly – via the broker-dealers (small retail
brokerages which were not broker-dealers transmitted customer orders to the
latter), and while large institutional investors had some alternatives (notably
Instinet, a system, owned by Reuters, designed to bring institutional buy and
sell orders together), they also often in practice needed to trade via broker-
dealers. Instead of the latter competing with each other to reduce the ‘spread’
between the price at which they would buy and the price at which they would
sell shares to its minimum (an eighth of a dollar), NASDAQ’s broker-dealers
implicitly colluded, by avoiding odd-eighth prices, to keep the ‘spread’ no
lower than a quarter of a dollar – thus in effect doubling their per-trade
income. (So profitable was the business that broker-dealers began to pay
brokers for sending them retail customers’ orders, a practice introduced by a
NASDAQ broker-dealer later to become a household name, Bernard Madoff.)
Damning tape recordings of broker-dealers’ telephone calls to each other were
discovered by the SEC and Department of Justice, and – in what was then
‘the largest civil antitrust settlement in history’ (Ingebretsen, 2002, p. 153) –
the broker-dealers collectively paid a reported $910 million to settle claims
against them.
That the NASDAQ broker-dealers via whom one had to trade avoided odd-
eighths price quotes (a practice that would have been visible to market
participants, who could see these quotes on NASDAQ screens, before Christie
and Schultz documented it) is one indicator of why those broker-dealers could
be seen as self-interested, privileged insiders. However, the flash-point of the
conflict out of which Island arose was a different aspect of NASDAQ,
introduced by the broker-dealers in 1984: the Small Order Execution System
(SOES), designed to reduce their labour costs by allowing retail brokerages to
submit their customers’ orders electronically to a broker-dealer firm and have
them filled at the prices it was quoting. During the 1987 stock market crash,
with its precipitously plunging prices, some NASDAQ market-makers stopped
processing SOES orders, and in response the SEC pushed NASDAQ to make
broker-dealers’ price quotations compulsorily executable via SOES for orders
of up to set sizes (for example, in the case of heavily traded stocks, 1,000
shares), a measure that came into force at the end of June 1988.
Quite unanticipated by either NASDAQ or the SEC, SOES almost
immediately began being used for quite a different purpose: intra-day trading.
A number of firms – first the small New Jersey brokerage Allstate Investment
Group (Donlan, 1988), then others, often based in lower Manhattan, such as
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Datek and Broadway Trading – started either employing traders or offering
self-employed traders the capacity to use SOES to create trading positions in
NASDAQ stocks that they would later quickly unwind, often at a profit. By
the middle of the 1990s, over 2,000 people were doing this full time, many in
and around Broad St.7 Visiting Island’s offices on the sixth floor of 50 Broad
St, with its ‘cramped halls and stained ceiling tiles’ (Brekke, 1999), two Forbes
journalists were also taken into second-floor rooms occupied by Broadway
Trading. They walked ‘through a sparsely furnished office suite’ into ‘a dimly
lit, makeshift trading room’:
There, from 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. each weekday, sit 50 people all males eyes
firmly attached to monitors. The players are mostly under 30, wearing T shirts,
blue jeans and baseball caps. They talk to one another even as they pound on
the keyboards. More often they just stare intently or blurt insults at the screens.
(Schifrin & McCormack, 1998)
In the opinion of NASDAQ’s broker-dealers, such traders were ‘SOES
bandits’: professionals who were cutting into their profits by exploiting the
requirement – designed to protect lay investors – that the SEC had placed
upon broker-dealers to honour their quotes when orders were received
electronically via SOES. It was, for example, typical for each NASDAQ stock
to have an ‘ax’: a broker-dealer firm that monitored trading conditions in that
stock most closely and altered its quotes appropriately. Other broker-dealers
would then follow suit, but a ‘SOES bandit,’ monitoring his or her screens
more intently than an employee of the broker-dealer, was often able to act
more quickly, for example buying shares from one broker-dealer and later
selling them to another at a higher price.8 NASDAQ broker-dealers tried and
failed to use regulation to shut ‘bandits’ out of SOES: in December 1988, the
SEC approved a proposal from NASD to prohibit the use of SOES by
‘Professional Trading Accounts’, but the rule was successfully challenged
legally.9 Endless legal skirmishing continued, however, as did verbal aggression
and even death threats to SOES bandits. Physical violence took place on at
least one occasion. A member of staff of a NASDAQ broker-dealer located at
43 Broad St, infuriated at being ‘SOES-ed’ by Datek’s traders, crossed to 50
Broad St and barged into Datek’s trading room, screaming ‘You did it again,
I’ll fucking kill you!’ He leapt at one of the Datek traders, and a more senior
trader picked up a letter opener and stabbed him forcibly, fortunately only in
the shoulder (Patterson, 2012, p. 87).
The expression ‘SOES bandit’ was, it seems, a deliberately pejorative
coinage by the NASDAQ broker-dealers. However, not all the connotations of
‘bandit’ were entirely misplaced, because at least some of those involved did
see themselves as outsiders, even rebels. Mike Bellafiore, a trader who worked
for Datek in the late 1990s, told us:
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[W]e were rebellious in the fact that we weren’t working at names of banks that
you knew … and we were rebellious in the sense that we didn’t have to go to
work in a suit … we were rebellious in the fact that we had a little bit more
flexibility when we could come and go. … [A]s long as you were making money,
the firm didn’t care much what you were doing. (Bellafiore interview)
Such trading could involve occasional gut-wrenching losses – ‘No one blinked
when a chalk-faced guy doubled over a garbage pail and puked violently, never
leaving his seat and trading right through the puke’ (Patterson, 2012, p. 113) –
and certainly was not always easy. For example, while SOES could be used
quickly to create a trading position, by the mid-1990s unwinding it at a profit
typically required use of either Instinet (designed, as noted above, for trading
by larger institutions) or SelectNet (Harris & Schultz, 1998). SelectNet was
another NASDAQ system, in this case originally intended for broker-dealers
to trade with each other by sending out bids to buy shares or offers to sell
them, and there was no compulsion on broker-dealers to respond to these bids
or offers when they came from ‘bandits’. So it was understandable that the
latter often saw themselves as facing ‘a closed system’, (Bellafiore interview),
run by NASDAQ broker-dealers to their own advantage. The ‘closed system,’
however, was about to be broken open decisively.
‘More evolved than designed’
As Josh Levine, Island’s original software architect and programmer, told us,
the first version of Island, launched in February 1996, ‘was, like most code
[computer programs] in the world, more evolved than designed’ (email,
21 May 2012). Island’s two founders were Levine (who, after having ‘[d]
ropped out and/or failed out’ from an electrical engineering major at Carnegie
Mellon, was earning his living writing software for the finance sector in New
York) and Jeffrey Citron, originally hired by Datek as a clerk. Once there,
Citron began to trade, eventually striking out on his own and recruiting Levine
to a number of joint ventures, several of which involved the development of
software to aid traders such as those working for firms like Datek and
Broadway. Both Citron and Levine retained close links to Datek, with Levine
remaining based in the firm’s 50 Broad St office.10
Amongst the systems Levine built was a program called FREDY, which
gave traders an audible warning when one of their NASDAQ orders had been
executed. While that now sounds like a simple feature to provide, the design of
electronic trading systems such as NASDAQ’s in the early 1990s was
predicated on the assumption of use by human beings not computer systems.
(Indeed, NASDAQ originally banned direct connections to users’ computer
systems [Steiner, 2012].) Users rented proprietary computer terminals from
NASDAQ, viewed price quotations on their visual display screens and entered
orders using their keyboard. Lists of completed trades were printed out onto
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continuous form paper by a line printer connected to the terminal. To build
FREDY, therefore, Levine wrote code that emulated a line printer. Another
Levine system was MonsterKey, which helped traders enter orders into SOES
more quickly by providing programmable ‘macros’ that greatly reduced the
number of keystrokes needed, and eventually also had a facility that
automatically calculated the price that gave the order the best chance of being
executed.11
Watcher, the program from which Island was born, was ‘[o]riginally built on
the printer-emulating code of FREDY’. It began ‘as just a program to watch
for incoming executions and keep track of a trader’s position’, but Levine
gradually added further features that turned it into a full-blown trading
system: giving traders up-to-date information on broker-dealers’ changing
quotes and other market news, permitting traders to enter orders and allowing
them to send messages either to particular other users or to all the traders
using Watcher (email from Levine, 27 January 2012; Anonymous, n.d.;
Anonymous, 1995–1997, 15 June 1995). As Patterson (2012, p. 90) notes,
Levine’s Watcher, designed as it was by a programmer who knew traders’
practices and priorities intimately, far outperformed NASDAQ’s clunky
proprietary terminals, helping Datek become pre-eminent amongst lower
Manhattan’s ‘bandits’.
Initially, Watcher users could not trade with each other, but only with
NASDAQ broker-dealers, via either SOES or SelectNet. However, Citron and
Levine noticed that it was quite common for one Watcher user to want to sell
shares at a given price and another to want to buy them at that price, but to be
unable to do so because the NASDAQ broker-dealers ‘rarely allowed
customers to trade inside the [usually 25 cent per share] spread, even if one
customer was willing to pay the same price that another customer wanted to
sell his stock for’ (Schifrin & McCormack, 1998). ‘We saw people trying to sell
stock at the same prices or overlapping prices, and their orders were going
unexecuted’, Citron told journalist Dan Brekke. As Citron went on gently to
put it (since this kind of behaviour by broker-dealers was at the centre of the
‘odd-eighths’ scandal): ‘There was tremendous inefficiency in the markets’
(Brekke, 1999).
Accordingly, Citron and Levine added to Watcher a facility (Customer to
Customer Jump trades) that allowed users to circumvent NASDAQ broker-
dealers entirely and trade directly with each other. ‘It worked like this’, Levine
told us:
1. You and me are sitting next to each other. I hear you mutter that you
are upset that you can[not] sell the 100 shares of INTC [Intel
Corporation] that you are currently long.
2. I am actually trying to buy INTC right now, so I say to you ‘Hey, I’ll
buy those 100 INTC from you [for] $125/share.’
3. You want to sell your INTC, so you agree to do the trade.
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4. I enter a Jump Trade into my Watcher and we both instantly see our
positions and P&L [profit and loss] updated – yours to reflect selling
100 INTC and mine to reflect buying 100 INTC. (email from Levine,
21 May 2012)
That way of proceeding, however, depended on happenstance one-to-one
interactions, and Island was developed so as to facilitate trading more widely,
initially amongst Watcher users: ‘the idea … was just simply an “island” where
investors could meet directly’ instead of having to go through the intermedi-
ation of NASDAQ broker-dealers (Andresen interview). ‘Island is here!’
Levine told users of Watcher on 16 February 1996. ‘If you put up 1000 shares
ZXYZ at 22 3/8 [$22.375] and someone else enters an Island order to buy 500
at 22 3/8’, then that buy order would be executed automatically. Correspond-
ingly, if
you see 4000 shares for ZXYZ for sale at 22 ½ on Island and you want to buy
stock at 22 ½. … You would press <Shift 2> to enter an order to buy 1000
shares (2 lots of 500). …Want to buy 2000 shares? Just press <Shift 2> twice.
Fun. (Anonymous, 1995–1997, 16 February 1996)
At first an ‘island’ alongside NASDAQ, Citron and Levine’s new system
quickly became a trading venue in its own right, an outcome that gained
‘legitimacy’ (interview, 18 April 2012) when in 1998 the Securities and
Exchange Commission adopted Regulation ATS, regulating and defining the
place of ‘alternative trading systems’ such as Island. Island was organized quite
differently from NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange, the main share-
trading venues in the United States. Instead of trading having to be conducted
via human intermediaries (NASDAQ’s broker-dealers or NYSE’s specialists),
Island’s users traded directly with each other with the intermediation only of
Island’s computer systems. Those systems maintained an anonymous ‘elec-
tronic’ book of buy orders and sell orders, along with the prices and quantities
bid for or offered. The ‘book’ was visible to all traders using the system.12
Island offered users far lower fees than existing trading venues, and Levine
invented an incentive, ‘rebates’, that was to become widely influential. A trader
who chose simply to take up a bid or offer in Island’s order book was charged a
quarter of a cent for each share traded (Biais et al., 2003, p. 6). However, a
trader who provided liquidity by posting an order in the book that another
trader then took up was paid by Island a tenth of a cent per share for doing so:
in other words, was paid a ‘rebate’.13 Also distinctive – and far more important
than the mere detail it first appears to be – is that prices on Island were
denominated in 1/256ths of a dollar: as noted above, share trading in the
US prior to Island was almost all done in eighths of dollars. Island’s much
finer-grained price grid made it possible for those who traded on it – who, as
described below, increasingly employed automated-trading systems – to
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undercut NASDAQ broker-dealers’ quotes by posting slightly higher bid
prices and slightly lower offers.14
Previous efforts to automate exchanges had typically involved the
exchange’s computer system sending out information that was displayed in
alphanumerical form on a proprietary screen designed for human beings to
view; often, all that was displayed was the current highest bid price and lowest
offer price. Again, Island’s approach was different. Levine developed a
computer protocol, ITCH, which was used continuously to disseminate all
incoming displayable orders and cancellations of orders, leaving it up to the
user’s computer system to ‘build the book on your side to figure out what the
best price was’ (interview, 18 April 2012). ITCH had a counterpart, OUCH,
designed to permit computerized input of orders and cancellations of orders
into Island’s systems. Levine made the application programming interface
(API) for Island, which facilitated interaction between its computer system and
users’ systems, publicly available on his website, josh.com. The experience of
computerized interaction with Island was thus utterly different from interac-
tion with earlier systems such as Instinet:
I mean people were screen-scraping the Instinet terminal in like, the late 90s,
right. [They would take] the RS-232 cable from the modem that you’re
supposed to plug into the [Instinet] terminal, and they would … plug it into
another computer and interpret the ASCII codes that were drawing the
rendering on the screen … of prices and … would send back [simulated]
keystrokes … just really obscure. (interview, 18 April 2012)15
Island also made it possible for those using automated trading systems to place
their servers in 50 Broad St, in the same building as Island’s own servers, and
so avoid the inevitable delays in using wider computer networks to route
orders and cancellations of orders to Island. Initially, this was an informal
arrangement (among the many firms that occupied the building’s warren of
offices was a web-services firm that would host trading firms’ servers
[interview, 9 December 2011]), but again it was a harbinger of what was to
become a widespread practice, now called ‘co-location’.
As computer equipment was added by both Island and other 50 Broad St
firms such as the web-services firm, the demands on the building’s electricity
supply grew. Originally, the building’s electricity bill was simply divided up
amongst its tenants according to the square footage of their offices, but that
practice became untenable once tenants not involved in automated trading
started to receive huge bills. Indeed, the heat generated by the multiple
computers in Island’s rooms started to become a real constraint on the addition
of further machines (Andresen interview). Such issues were indicators of the
new venue’s success. By February 1998, when Island still had only four
employees, it had captured 4 per cent of trading on NASDAQ, and was the
third most important mechanism of such trading, after the broker-dealers
themselves, who had a 78 per cent share, and Instinet (Schifrin & McCormack,
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1998). By February 2002, Island’s share of NASDAQ trading reached 9.6 per
cent, approaching Instinet’s 12 per cent share (Biais et al., 2003, p. 6).
‘That’s too bad, man, we could have changed the world’
In 1998, despite Island’s still small size, Levine sought to appoint a chief
executive to lead the business (Levine’s original business partner, Jeffrey
Citron, was moving on to other ventures). He approached Matt Andresen, who
had moved to New York because he was a fencer and ‘was the only guy in the
top ten in the US that was not training in the New York Athletic Club’. Once
there, Andresen had become a successful trader (in interview, he did not reject
the label ‘SOES bandit’), but otherwise had no business experience. Because of
that, he initially said no to Levine’s suggestion, but when Levine replied,
‘That’s too bad, man, we could have changed the world’, Andresen changed
his mind, describing it as ‘my Pete Best moment’ (Andresen interview).16
Levine’s unconventional choice of CEO indicates that Island’s success did
not cause it to become simply another financial institution: it retained more the
flavour of a dot.com start-up. There were ‘piles of garbage’ in its Broad St
offices (interview, 10 December 2012). Another interviewee described to us
joining Island and discovering that those offices housed both a makeshift turtle
tank (he fed the turtles, but also had the less pleasant task of changing
the water) and a computer-numerically controlled milling machine, which
Levine wanted to use to make a jewellery box for his wife, and which another
new recruit had to learn how to program (interview, 18 April 2012).
The contrast in self-presentation between Island and the longer-established,
institution-oriented Instinet was sharp. Earlier, Instinet had been technologic-
ally very innovative, but it had become ‘corporate’. Its headquarters was in one
of New York’s most conspicuous skyscrapers, the newly completed Reuters
Building on Times Square, and ‘the chairman of Instinet had this gorgeous
corner office’, says Andresen. ‘[A]t great expense’, Instinet ‘had installed a
balcony overlooking Times Square’. In contrast, he says, Island was ‘cold rice
and rat meat’. The phrase invokes Coppola’s Apocalypse now (‘Charlie [the
Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces] didn’t get much USO. He was dug in
too deep, or movin’ too fast. His idea of great R&R was cold rice and a little rat
meat’17), but mention of rats in 50 Broad St was not always hyperbole. Traders
would often go outside to smoke in narrow, rat-infested New St, which ran
behind the building. Island ‘had bagel Tuesdays where we’d bring in day-old
bagels for the firm, you know, “yay! Employee morale”’ (Andresen interview).
Little effort was put into cultivating customers in Wall Street’s traditional
manner (buying them dinner, etc.), but some distinctive forms of advertising
were found. For example, Island distributed free yellow raincoats bearing its
name. ‘I always took great pleasure any rainy day … you looked out of my
office on Broad St and you’d just see hundreds of these: Island coat, Island
coat, Island coat’ (Andresen interview).
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Island was also distinctive technologically: two of its newly recruited
programmers were immediately struck by differences between Island’s system
and any other system in the finance sector they had seen: ‘first of all, we didn’t
think it would work, except that it was up and running so clearly it worked’
(interview, 18 April 2012). ‘[B]ack then people were still building things
monolithically’, in other words having an entire system run on an ultra-
powerful, extremely expensive computer (Andresen interview). In contrast,
Levine saw no need for expensive hardware and preferred to use not one
machine but multiple, cheap PC central processor units: ‘the first version of
Island … ran on an AST Bravo Pentium P90. … We used those machines for
everything, they were small, fast, and cheap’ (email from Levine, 21 May
2012). ‘Josh was like, “no, no, no, I don’t want any piece of hardware that costs
more than four grand”’, says Andresen. The one major exception that was
made was an ultra-large-capacity server ‘to keep track of everything we’ve ever
done’ (Andresen interview).
Island’s ‘matching engine’, the technical heart of its system, was an
algorithm called the ‘enter2order’ procedure, which Levine wrote in FoxPro,
a programming language for database management developed by Fox Software
(Figure 2). Levine found a simple but hugely consequential ‘trick’ to speed
matching. In Levine’s later paraphrase, what the ‘enter2order’ procedure did
when the Island system received a new order was to:
See if there was a record from a recently cancelled order that we can reuse for
this new order. This is hugely important because that record will likely still be
in the cache [fast internal memory] and using it will be *much* faster than
making a new one. (Levine, n.d.)
After generating a ‘sequence number and time stamp’ for the new order, the
algorithm then checked whether the order ‘could potentially be filled’ by
matching it with orders already in the book. If so:
Start matching! Starting at the top of the book [if the new order was, e.g., an
order to sell, the ‘top of the book’ is the existing buy orders with the highest
price] until we either run out of shares or orders to match against. (Levine, n.d.)
Also crucial to the speed of the matching engine was a distinctive design
decision that made it possible for the matching engine not to have to pause for
‘two-phase commits’18 to check that changes in the order book were being
correctly recorded in system memory:
the way he [Levine] did it was so radically different from anything I’d seen
before … the matching engine … broadcasts out its messages in a stream that
everyone reads, it assumes that if I wrote this thing on the wire that everyone
else can be responsible for writing it to disk. (interview, 18 April 2012)
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Figure 2 The start of the ‘enter2order’ procedure, the heart of Island’s matching engine. Taken from the source code of the matching engine,
available at http://www.josh.com/notes/island-ecn-10th-birthday/
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It is worth noting that initially Levine was the sole architect and programmer
of the Island computer system, making it possible for him simply himself to
take technical decisions such as this that in other contexts in the financial
sector might involve multiple meetings and protracted negotiation. The result
of these decisions was that the response time of Island’s system was hugely
faster than that of existing systems.19 A user in the New York City area could
send in an order to Island and receive a response from the system in around
two milliseconds; the equivalent for an Instinet user could be as much as two
seconds (email from Levine, 21 May 2012; interview, 9 December 2011).
Island’s ultrafast matching engine had qualitative as well as quantitative
effects, because it meant that in their pursuit of speed the nascent automated
trading firms using Island (see the next section) started to focus on other
sources of delay that were not salient when interacting with a slower system.
For example, in around 2002 informal co-location in 50 Broad St became – for,
as far as we can tell, the first time anywhere – a formal, paid-for arrangement
when the automated trading firm Tradebot realized that the transmission delay
(of the order of ten milliseconds, or a hundredth of a second) in the fibre-optic
cables between its Kansas City office and New York was putting it at a
disadvantage. ‘We were excluded because of the speed of light’, Tradebot’s
founder Dave Cummings told The Wall Street Journal: ‘We had to move our
computers’ to 50 Broad St (Lucchetti, 2006).
Levine protected the simple, fast elegance of Island’s system. Only a very
limited number of order types were implemented in the system: essentially,
just bids to buy shares at or below a limit price, and offers to sell them at or
above a limit price. (Later, more complex forms of order were sometimes
added to other systems as a way of attracting customers who wanted to employ
them, a practice that is now under investigation by the SEC, because of
allegations that it is an unhealthy aspect of the symbiosis – outlined in the next
section – between trading venues and automated trading firms.) ‘Josh was very,
very rigorous, you know: “why do you want that order type, and why is it
fundamentally different from a limit order?” … [H]e could push back in a very
articulate way’ (interview, 18 April 2012).
So the bricolage involved in first developing Watcher, and then developing
and evolving Island, was never simply random or opportunistic bricolage, a
mere response to immediate demands and opportunities. Some of what guided
it could be described as a ‘programmer’s aesthetic’: a preference for the cheap,
simple and fast over the expensive, complex and cumbersome. ‘I write
programs to solve problems’, Levine told journalist Dan Brekke. ‘I enjoy
writing elegant programs. Island’s an elegant solution to an annoying problem’
(email, 22 March 1999). As that understated ‘annoying’ suggests, however,
more was involved than simply a preference for technically elegant solutions. It
is striking, for example, that Island did not simply make its order book visible
to its customers, but also did something no exchange previously had: Levine
wrote a program, ‘BookViewer’, that allowed anyone with internet access to see
the contents of Island’s order book in close to real time. He made himself (and
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Peter Stern, Datek’s Chief Technology Officer) visible via webcam and his site
josh.com:
In ‘Josh’s Corner’ [of josh.com] you’ll see a bullet-headed, pale, dark-haired
young man wearing a T-shirt and tapping away at a computer amid a dumpster-
like heap of bottles, cans, take-out food containers, papers, and books.
(Brekke, 1999)
As Brekke reported, Levine and Stern would even get up and dance if visitors
to josh.com pressed an electronic ‘bell’.
Although we have not found an instance of his use of the actual phrase,
Levine’s actions, as Patterson (2012) notes, indicate his commitment to the
famous slogan first coined at a ‘Hackers’ Conference’ in 1984 by Stewart
Brand, who linked Silicon Valley to San Francisco’s counterculture: ‘informa-
tion wants to be free’. (Anonymous, 1985, p. 49; see Turner, 2006). A ‘hacker’
was both a skilled, dedicated programmer, for whom writing software was a –
sometimes obsessive – pleasure, and also a believer in opening up closed
systems (see Levy, 1984). Although his work made him rich, Levine – like
many hackers – seemed little guided by personal monetary reward. ‘[T]here’s
that whole hacker ethos of “I’m above money”,’ but unlike in many cases in
which ‘they affect it because it’s considered cool’, Andresen found it to be
genuine in Levine’s case: ‘I’d be like, “Josh, here’s your bonus cheque”, [and]
he was like, “ah, give it to those guys”’ (Andresen interview).20 Levine
provided crucial technical help, free of charge, to what became Island’s
perhaps most potent rival: the new Chicago-based electronic trading venue,
Archipelago. He not only spent many phone calls advising its founder Jerry
Putnam, but even sent, gratis, segments of Island’s software (Patterson, 2012,
p. 144).
What Andresen remembers Levine telling him in 1998 (‘we could have
changed the world’) shows that by then Levine had a broader ambition than
making money or even simply designing an elegant technical system, and the
occasional presence in Levine’s phraseology of the turn of phrase of the social
activist was, perhaps, not entirely accidental. Trying to persuade the journalist
Dan Brekke to focus less on his biography and more on the structure of
markets, Levine wrote: ‘The people need a good flowchart’ (email to Brekke,
12 April 1999). Exasperated by a vexatious lawsuit by an ‘unhappy daytrading
customer’ (and perhaps also by journalists continuing to focus on ‘matters of
personalities as opposed to facts’) he told Brekke: ‘It’s likely that I will soon
remove and destroy the josh.com website and stop trying to help the people
altogether’ (email to Brekke, 27 April 1999).
In his 1999 correspondence with Brekke, ‘[a]fter about three minutes of
thought’, Levine spelled out ‘seven steps to building a good market’:
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I think that pure auction markets are the best way to price and trade stocks (and
some other things too).
A market should be fair and that fairness should be obvious from [its] design
rather than something that needs to be monitored and regulated externally.
A market should encourage the creation and free dissemination of information.
A market’s usage fees should be reasonable and cost-based and should
encourage participants to behave in ways that are good for the market as a
whole.
A market should have low barriers to entry.
A market should be inclusive, not exclusive. The more participants, the better
for everyone.
A market’s technology should be fast, simple, robust, and scaleable. (email to
Brekke, 22 March 1999)
Island becomes a continent
By 1999, these precepts seemed ‘mostly common sense type stuff’ to Levine
(email to Brekke, 22 March 1999). We have to be careful, however, not to read
this ‘common sense’ backwards in time, as a preformed vision he had
always held, nor to over-intellectualize it as, for example, a crystallization of
free-market economics.21 Asked by us what had led him to it, Levine gave us
not a systematizer’s abstract answer but a bricoleur’s concrete one, citing his
accumulated experience rather than, for example, any author:
With Watcher, we had a lot of experience interacting with markets that were
unfair, inefficient, and poorly regulated so we certainly knew what we wanted to
avoid. (email from Levine, 21 May 2012)
It would certainly be quite wrong to read Levine’s precepts forward, as a
blueprint for what was to come. The ‘information libertarian’ aspect of them
largely did not survive: information might have wanted to be free, but
capitalism had other priorities. No exchange or other trading venue of which
we are aware now offers an equivalent of Levine’s BookViewer, allowing
anyone real-time sight of its order book. The data feeds from trading venues
are not free: indeed, they are a vitally important source of revenue for venues.
Similarly, Levine might have wanted to stick to a small set of simple order
types, but order types have subsequently proliferated and have become far
more complex. Island was an influential exemplar, but an exemplar is not a
template, and bricolage is not simple copying.
How, then, did Island’s exemplar become influential? Limited space means
that we can do no more than sketch an answer to that question, but at least
three processes were involved. The first is the most straightforward: the
diffusion of people and of technical designs. Island did not survive for long: in
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2000 its owner, Datek Online Holdings, sold it to a group of investors
including Bain Capital (co-founded by Mitt Romney), and in 2002 those
investors sold Island to the trading venue to which it was the most direct
threat, Instinet. In 2005, NASDAQ – the system that Island was created to
circumvent – bought the US business of the merged entity. However,
although the two takeovers each involved a bigger, richer company buying
up a smaller rival, that rival’s staff and approach to technical systems
substantially changed its new owner. Island programmers rewrote Instinet’s
antiquated system, preserving its familiar interface (‘the green screen’, as
traders called it) but discarding the old, slow matching engine in favour of a
design that was essentially Island’s.
NASDAQ, too, was transformed into something more like Island, although
in its case the process had begun before 2005. Gone was the broker-dealer
oligopoly: in its place, an electronic order book. A version of Levine’s code –
albeit by now much rewritten – still runs in the matching engines of
NASDAQ, the second largest share-trading venue in the world. Although
there are other, slower ways to interact with those engines, NASDAQ offers
ITCH and OUCH to those who want speed, and those protocols, or minor
variants of them, are used by many other trading venues. The considerable
bulk of share trading in the United States now resembles trading on Island far
more closely than it resembles 1990s NASDAQ or New York Stock Exchange.
The established order in Europe, dominated by centuries-old institutions such
as the London Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse, has also been transformed,
and a crucial vehicle of its transformation was Chi-X, a new trading venue set
up in 2007, with a matching engine written by two former Island programmers.
A second, more general factor causing share trading at large to become more
like trading on Island is that the regulators of this trading, first in the United
States and then in Europe, have deliberately sought to promote competition
between trading venues. What Burchell (1996) says of neo-liberal thinkers
holds directly here:
[T]hey do not regard the market as an existing quasi-natural reality … Rather,
the market exists, and can only exist, under certain political, legal and
institutional conditions that must be actively constructed by government.
(Burchell 1996, p. 23)
Historically, the ‘quasi-natural reality’ of financial markets has overwhelmingly
been oligopoly of the kind exemplified by NASDAQ or de facto monopoly of
the kind enjoyed by the New York Stock Exchange (see Preda, 2009 on the
‘social closure’ of stock exchanges). It has taken powerful regulators – above all
the US SEC, since European regulation has largely followed the lead of the
SEC in this respect – to create what might aptly be called a ‘market for
markets’ (Schwartz, 2010, p. 18). Trading venues – now nearly all corpora-
tions, not membership-owned organizations – have to compete with each other
for business, and the competition is often fierce.
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The existence of competition amongst markets, however, does not in itself
determine what market form will triumph, and in the 1990s new electronic
forms of market quite different from Island were created (notably the Arizona
Stock Exchange, with its discontinuous call auctions [see Muniesa, 2011]), as
well as several other venues that more closely resembled Island. Here a third
factor is important in Island becoming the most influential exemplar: Island’s
close links to a crucial category of user, the nascent automated-trading firms.
‘Everything we did’, Levine told us (email, 21 May 2012), ‘was a collaborative
effort between us and our users. Almost all of the good ideas came from the
outside, we just listened and implemented them’. (Like the pervasiveness of
bricolage, the role that users often play in innovation is an important theme of
the sociology of technology [see, for example, Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003].) As
noted above, trading venues before Island at most tolerated automated trading,
doing little or nothing to facilitate it. With its downloadable API, its fast
matching engine, ITCH, OUCH, its fine-grid prices and its rebates, Island was
utterly different. Only a handful of automated-trading firms pre-date Island,
and one of the oldest of them, Automated Trading Desk, set up in Charleston,
SC in 1988, ‘was the first firm to sign up with Island’ (Wipperfurth, 1999).
The newer automated-trading firms created in the late 1990s, such as Tradebot
and the Chicago-based Getco, also flocked to Island.
Above all, Island’s technical system (for example, its ultrafast matching
engine) enabled the development of a form of automated trading that had been
difficult if not impossible on earlier venues: electronic market-making. In this,
an automated-trading firm’s technical system constantly kept keenly priced
bids to buy shares and offers to sell them in Island’s electronic order book,
with smaller ‘spreads’ between the bid and offer prices than quoted by
NASDAQ’s broker-dealers. Co-location, fast feeds and a fast matching engine
enabled automated-trading firms to minimize the main risk of market-making:
being ‘run over’, as market-makers call it, in other words caught holding shares
(or a short position in them) when prices move adversely. A co-located
computer server processing the ITCH feed direct from Island’s matching
engine (and using other sources of information as well, such as price
movements in the stock-index futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange’s Globex system) could normally detect such movements fast
enough to avoid being badly ‘run over’, using OUCH to cancel its
exiting bids and offers before they were filled and resubmit them at different
prices.
A kind of symbiosis thus developed between Island and electronic market-
making firms. Island’s speed and its rebates (which provided market-makers
with a source of income additional to the ‘spread’ between bid and offer prices)
gave them what they needed to conduct their business profitably and with
reasonable safety, while their constant presence in the order book gave Island
the liquidity and the tight ‘spreads’ that made it an attractive place for trading.
Other venues competing with Island thus had little option but to develop a
form of symbiosis of their own. Despite Levine’s help, Archipelago, for
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example, was initially handicapped by having a matching engine far slower
than Island’s, an engine that was also limited in its capacity to handle large
volumes of orders. Amongst dissatisfied customers was Tradebot’s founder,
Dave Cummings, who told Jamie Selway, Archipelago’s Chief Economist:
‘I can’t manage that risk’, i.e. the danger of being ‘run over’ in the one or two
seconds it could take Archipelago’s system to process orders and cancellations.
Selway told TheWall Street Journal that he then spent ‘a hundred hours on the
phone’ with Cummings – who, like Levine, was a skilled programmer –
discussing how to make Archipelago’s system faster and better able to cope
with high volumes (Lucchetti, 2006).
The effort was successful: like Island, Archipelago became a formidable
competitor to the established venues, and, like it, Archipelago too was bought
by one of those venues, in its case the New York Stock Exchange, which drew
on its technology in rebuilding the NYSE trading system and offered NYSE
Arca, as it renamed Archipelago, as an alternative to that system. The
takeovers, however, did not remove the pressure from NASDAQ and NYSE.
Their most successful competitors are now Direct Edge (which in its first
manifestation was a trading venue called Attain, set up by Domestic Securities,
the firm of the pioneer of SOES banditry, Harvey Houtkin) and BATS,
launched in 2005 by Dave Cummings and a team from Tradebot. Together,
Direct Edge and BATS almost rival the market shares of NASDAQ and
NYSE/NYSE Arca (Table 1).
Conclusion: cogs matter; does history?
It would take a deep commitment to what Lie (1997) calls ‘ontological
indeterminacy’ – to the idea that the material form taken by markets does not
matter much – to deny that the transformation of share trading in the United
States (and elsewhere) is important. Twenty years ago, share trading in the
Table 1 Distribution of trading of US shares by venue, March 2012
NASDAQ (inc. NASDAQ OMX BX and PSX) 21.9%
New York Stock Exchange (inc. NYSE MKT) 12.5%
NYSE Arca 11.7%
BATS (BZX and BYX) 10.9%
Direct Edge (EDGX and EDGA) 9.0%
All other exchanges 1.0%
Lava Flow (electronic communications network) 1.8%
Dark pools 13.2%
Broker-dealer internationalization and over-the-counter 18.0%
100.0%
Source: CFA Institute (2012). Dark pools are trading venues in which the order book is not visible
to participants. Internationalization is when a broker-dealer itself directly executes (i.e. acts as the
counterparty to) customer orders.
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United States was still almost entirely human-mediated and mostly took place
in just two market-places: NYSE and NASDAQ. Now, there are 13 exchanges
and more than 50 other trading venues. Only a very small minority of deals are
now consummated by human beings: the heart of trading is tens of thousands
of computer servers, in often huge data-centres linked by fibre-optic cables
carrying millions of messages a second.
Share trading in the United States has thus become a giant, partially
integrated technical system. The most dramatic demonstration of its potential
vulnerability is the ‘flash crash’ of the afternoon of 6 May 2010: in around 20
minutes, overall share prices in the United States plunged precipitously and
then recovered almost as quickly, with bizarre fluctuations in some stocks,
some falling in price to a cent, and others rising in price to $99,999.99 (see,
e.g., CFTC/SEC, 2010). The trigger of the crash was not an electronic
market-making algorithm of the kind perfected on Island, but a simpler sell
algorithm set in motion by a mutual fund. However, that afternoon’s events
show the potential for instability in the new material infrastructure of share
trading. While regulatory measures – such as ‘circuit-breakers’ that pause
trading in a stock if its price moves very sharply – have been introduced in the
United States to reduce the chance of a repetition, it is too early to say whether
they will prove successful. Fierce controversy has also erupted in Europe over
automated trading. In September 2012, for example, the European Parliament
voted for a compulsory half-second minimum ‘resting time’ in which an
order cannot be cancelled, and the German government adopted a draft
Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz requiring algorithm-generated orders to be ear-
marked as such and high-frequency firms to be licensed. If implemented, the
resting-time requirement in particular would be a dramatic change in the
market ecology whose evolution we have sketched here.
The cogs, we would argue, are clearly important. Does their history matter?
That is a conjecture, and it could be false. Perhaps the form of market first
fully brought into being on Island is a kind of ‘attractor’, a form towards which
trading would be drawn irrespective of local struggles, local culture and path-
dependent bricolage of the kind discussed in earlier sections. Something akin
to that was argued by the economist Lawrence Glosten in 1994, before Island
was even established. ‘Is the electronic open limit order book’ – the generic
kind of market of which Island was a particularly influential variant –
‘inevitable?’ asked Glosten, and he answered the question with at least a
tentative ‘yes’. ‘[T]he open limit order book’, his theoretical analysis suggested,
‘is a stable institution and, within the set of economic environments and
trading structures considered, the only stable institution’ (Glosten, 1994,
p. 1128). It was, in other words, an attractor.
Taken on its own, the history of share trading over the past two decades is
compatible with the ‘attractor’ hypothesis as well as with our ‘path-dependent
bricolage’ hypothesis. It is worth noting, however, that while Island became a
continent, it has not become the world. While shares, futures and to some
extent options, at least in North America, Western Europe and much of East
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Asia, are now generally traded on markets similar to Island, the same is not
true of other asset classes such as bonds. (Foreign exchange is a kind of
intermediate case, and while regulators have been pushing for interest-rate
derivatives and credit derivatives to move onto electronic order books, that
effort is still far from complete.) True, in some cases bonds have features that
make trading in the style of Island difficult: the bonds issued by corporations
are much more heterogeneous than their shares, limiting the liquidity of
corporate bonds. That is, however, certainly not the case for US Federal
government securities (Treasury bills, notes and bonds), especially ‘on-the-
run’ (the most recently issued securities). These securities are generally seen as
the most liquid financial instruments on the planet, yet to a large extent they
are traded in a way that much more closely resembles 1980s NASDAQ than
Island (although, at least so far, without a scandal on quite the scale of ‘odd
eighths’). There are 21 officially designated primary dealers in US Federal
government securities, 20 of them well-known banks or subsidiaries of such
banks, and the other a big inter-dealer broker, Cantor Fitzgerald. Although
there are electronic platforms on which Treasury securities can be traded, it is
still largely a ‘dealer market’. It is, for example, the primary dealers who buy
nearly all Treasury securities, sell them on into the secondary market and play
a large role in trading in that market.
There is no clear sign here of an Island-style open electronic order book
being an attractor, even though the trading of government securities falls
within the remit of the Securities and Exchange Commission, just as share
trading does.22 Although the reasons for the difference remain to be
researched, they may include a ‘big culture’ factor – that ‘mom and pop in
Peoria’, the archetypal small investors of the American imaginary who need the
SEC’s protection, are envisioned as buying and selling shares, not bonds –
along with two more specific factors: the absence in the government bond
market of any concerted move ‘from below’ against dealer hegemony analogous
to the rebellion of the SOES bandits and Island against the NASDAQ broker-
dealers; and a political-economy consideration absent in share trading. There is
an almost explicit bargain in which, in return for their central position in the
market, the primary dealers take on obligations. As the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, operating arm of the Federal Reserve system, puts it, primary
dealers are ‘required to participate in all auctions of U.S. government debt’ and
have to ‘provide the New York Fed’s trading desk with market information
and analysis helpful in the formulation and implementation of monetary
policy’.23 There is an informal obligation, one interviewee suggested to us, on
the primary dealers to make sure that no auction of US Federal debt fails.
A capitalist, neo-liberal world thus sustains multiple forms of market, and
quite possibly may continue to do so: the open electronic order book is not an
all-powerful transhistorical attractor. Our argument is not that outcomes such
as this are the result only of small actors and local contexts: big actors and global
processes also play their part. But we remain emphatic that historical change
can involve a shift in scale. In this paper, we have focused on a small actor
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becoming big, on Island becoming a continent. However, we could equally have
told a story of big actors becoming small, for example of the New York Stock
Exchange, once a proudly autonomous social world that dominated share
trading in the United States, becoming one venue among several (Table 1),
subject like all other venues to the pressures of competition and the need for a
symbiosis with automated trading: in other words, a story of NYSE becoming
simply one part of the large socio-technical system that share trading has
become.24 (In December 2012, that status was underlined by the announcement
that an upstart electronic commodity-futures trading venue, the Interconti-
nentalExchange, was buying NYSE.) NYSE was a car, and has become a cog.
Island was a cog that became a car, the archetype of the new socio-economic
and socio-technical environment within which even the longest-established
stock exchange now has to operate. Scales are indeed not stable, and cogs – and
their histories – matter.
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Notes
1 The set of panels looks like concrete but is ‘actually painted foam. You could pick
it up with one hand. It is glued onto the façade’. (email from Josh Levine,
1 September 2012)
2 As Kuhn (1970, p. 145) notes, the notion of the paradigm as the successful
exemplar, the ‘concrete puzzle-solution’, is ‘[p]hilosophically … deeper’ than what
became its standard interpretation as a constraining framework of thought. Exemplars
are crucial because they are key cultural raw materials of ‘bricolage’ (see below).
3 In everyday French, ‘bricolage’ is ‘do-it-yourself’ or tinkering. ‘J’ai bricolé une
bibliothèque’ would ordinarily mean ‘I knocked together a bookcase.’ The term was
introduced to the Anglophone social sciences by Lévi-Strauss (1966), and although he
sought to separate the scientist from the myth-making bricoleur, sociologists of science
seized on ‘bricolage’ as a fertile metaphor for the way innovators ‘redeploy … pieces of
culture in new ways to perform new tasks’ (Barnes, 1974, p. 58).
4 Riles, for instance, is right to dismiss the ‘notion of the financial market as an
offshoot of science’ (2010, p. 796). That version of the performativity of economics –
the idea that economics, even in the narrow academic sense, is sometimes actively
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drawn on in the very construction of markets, rather than simply providing passive
‘external’ representations of them – is clearly incompatible with the bricolage
hypothesis. This is not the place for an extended discussion of recent critiques of
performativity such as Riles (2010) and Bryan et al. (2012), but let us briefly say that it
should not be read as a version of the simplistic linear model of technological
innovation, which does indeed see technological change as an ‘offshoot of science’. The
arguments against the linear model are, e.g., briefly summarized in MacKenzie and
Wajcman (1985, pp. 8–9).
5 Unfortunately, messages before March 1995 appear no longer to be extant.
6 Because these Island employees went on to work for automated trading firms, and
that is a publicity-shy sector, we draw on those interviews anonymously, citing only the
date of the interview. Island’s co-founder, Jeffrey Citron, did not respond to our
request for an interview.
7 The estimate of over 2,000 comes from James Lee, then President of the Electronic
Traders Association (Harris & Schultz, 1998, p. 41).
8 This was not the only trading strategy of the ‘bandits’: others included ‘momentum
trading’ (identifying rises or falls in prices that were likely to persist for at least a short
period) and spotting when a large institutional order was being ‘worked’ and e.g. buying
shares ahead of it (GAO, 1998, pp. 10–11).
9 William Timpinaro et al. v Securities and Exchange Commission, 2 F.3d 453
(US Court of Appeals, 1993).
10 Email from Levine, 27 January 2012; Brekke (1999). Citron’s role was primarily
the business side of his and Levine’s joint ventures, but he did some of the early
programming, and Levine testifies to his influence: ‘pretty much everything I did was
… shaped and guided by the long and deep arguments we would have’ (email from
Levine, 21 May 2012).
11 Emails from Levine, 27 January and 21 May 2012. SOES orders were always filled
at the broker-dealer’s quote, but for example inputting a sell order with a price well
below the broker-dealer’s bid increased the chances of the order being filled (but also
carried the risk that the broker-dealer’s quote would have changed by the time that
happened).
12 Later, a facility was added to permit users to submit orders that would not be
displayed in the order book, although in the matching process described below
undisplayed orders had lower priority than visible orders.
13 Initially, Island offered a ‘order-entry rebate’ that went to those who ran the
trading systems from which orders were sent, in order, Levine told us, to ‘incentivize’
them to implement and support the technical interconnection as well as possible. The
rebate structure was later changed to that described in the text following Levine’s
thoughts about the ‘price of immediacy’ (the cost to a trader who simply took up an
existing bid or offer) and ‘price of liquidity’, the cost to a trader who posted a bid or offer
in the order book and thus gave other traders an implicit option (in the financial-market
sense): the right but not obligation to take up that bid or offer (email from Levine,
21 May 2012; emphases in original).
14 This pattern of price setting on Island is clearly documented by Biais et al. (2003).
15 RS-232 was a set of standards for the interconnection between computers and
peripheral devices, now largely superseded by USB (universal serial bus). ASCII is the
standard way of encoding English-language letters, digits and other characters.
16 Best was the original drummer of The Beatles, later replaced by Ringo Starr.
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17 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Apocalypse_Now, accessed 4 November 2012,
quotation corrected. The United Services Organizations (USO) provide entertainment
to US forces; R&R is ‘rest and recuperation’.
18 A ‘two-phase commit’ is the procedure by which a system writes information onto
a disk or other form of memory and receives back a message acknowledging that the
information has indeed been written.
19 Island’s was not the first electronic order book. Earlier examples include exchanges
in Toronto, Paris, Frankfurt, Chicago and Cincinnati, as well as the Instinet system
touched on in the text (see, e.g., Muniesa, 2003).
20 ‘Those guys’ were the programmers who had taken over much of the program-
ming burden from Levine (email from Levine, 1 September 2012).
21 Patterson (2012, pp. 90–91) reports that in the mid-1990s Levine did read work on
the economics of market microstructure, in particular Schwartz (1993). However,
Schwartz (1993) shows only limited enthusiasm for a market form such as Island,
instead advocating discontinuous call auctions, such as those implemented in the
unsuccessful Arizona Stock Exchange (Schwartz, 1993, pp. 196–207; Muniesa, 2011).
22 There is, however, what may be a harbinger. In April 2013, NASDAQ bought the
electronic bond-trading platform eSpeed from its owner, the interdealer broker BCG.
23 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html, accessed 6 Novem-
ber 2012.
24 For a sociological portrait of NYSE on the brink of the process of change
discussed here, see Abolafia (1996). For NYSE’s limited but partially successful attempt
to ‘fold’ the social world of its specialists into algorithms, see Beunza and Millo (2012).
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